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All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside.  No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.1 
 
∗ Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law.  I am grateful for the feedback I received 
from and interaction with the other participants in this symposium, including David Bogen, Ellen 
Connally, Gwen Jordan, William Rich, Michael Ross, and William Wiecek.  I am particularly 
grateful for the guidance and encouragement of Dick Aynes.  In addition, related aspects of this 
project have benefited from the feedback of participants at forums and presentations at the 2008 
Midwest Political Science Association, the William S. Boyd School of Law (UNLV), and the 
Midwest Law & Society Retreat held by the Institute for Legal Studies at the University of 
Wisconsin Law School.  This project is generously supported by a research grant from the Stetson 
University College of Law. 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  The first sentence is commonly known as the Citizenship 
Clause and the first part of the second sentence as the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  For 
background on the framing and initial treatment of these clauses, see Richard L. Aynes, Unintended 
Consequences of the Fourteenth Amendment and What They Tell Us About Its Interpretation, 39 
AKRON L. REV. 289, 290-300 (2006). 
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Consider the first sentence of section one of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The non-legal reader might quite reasonably say that such 
an introductory and framing sentence indicates that the Amendment is 
about citizenship.  Such a reading would be reinforced by moving to the 
second sentence, which gives lexical priority to the concepts of 
citizenship privileges and immunities in its list of protected areas.  And 
the reader who bothered to go deeper into the Amendment—indeed, 
deeper than many lawyers and law professors ever do—would surely 
find confirmation of the importance of citizenship in the second section 
(addressing citizenship in its somewhat convoluted linkage between 
congressional apportionment and the voting rights of black male 
citizens),2 and the third section (enforcing a form of citizenship 
allegiance by barring members of the confederacy who had previously 
served in the government of the United States or any state from serving 
in any state or federal position after the war).3  The reader might even 
note that citizenship continues to be the topic of the ensuing amendment, 
ratified only two years later, which more directly prohibited abridgment 
on the basis of race of “[t]he right of citizens” to vote.4 
But constitutional law is not a normal, reasonable enterprise.  
Sections two and three of the Fourteenth Amendment, being more 
political than legal enactments, have had essentially no judicial or legal 
development.5  Yet even the first sentence of section one and the ensuing 
 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.  This section was a compromise designed by congressional 
Republicans to prevent southern whites from denying suffrage to blacks under state laws while also 
gaining more seats in Congress by claiming African-Americans in the numeric calculations for 
apportionment, which would have resulted in greater southern white dominance in the House of 
Representatives than was true before the Civil War, when enslaved blacks counted as three-fifths of 
a person for apportionment purposes.  Such a goal could have been achieved by simply basing 
representation on the number of qualified voters in each state.  That, however, would have forced 
northern states to choose between enfranchising women and unnaturalized immigrants or having a 
smaller proportionate representation, especially as white men migrated west.  The particularly 
convoluted, race-based language of the Amendment protected northern interests while preventing an 
immediate southern democratic resurgence.  See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S 
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 at 252 (1988).  It also caused an almost irreparable rift 
between advocates of women’s suffrage and the Republican party by specifying protection only for 
male suffrage.  Id. at 255. 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 3.  This section also enabled Congress to remove this 
disability by two-thirds vote.  Id.  Congress did so in 1872.  See Act of May 22, 1872, ch. 193, 17 
Stat. 142 (removing political disabilities imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment).  This section was 
generally considered a mild punishment for confederates, replacing as it did a disenfranchisement of 
confederates through 1870.  FONER, supra note 2, at 253-54. 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §1. 
 5. The Supreme Court did refer to section two in Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 41-57 
(1974) (upholding state disqualification of former felons from voting and citing section two as 
lending implied support for this position). 
2
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Privileges or Immunities Clause have had relatively little play in the 
courts.  With the single exception of the 1999 case of Saenz v. Roe,6 the 
citizenship language of the Fourteenth Amendment has practically no 
legal significance. 
A few scholars have suggested ways of building some meaning 
around the citizenship ideas.  Akhil Amar, for instance, has argued that 
the Citizenship Clause establishes that everyone born in the United 
States is “a free and equal citizen” and it helps empower the federal 
government “to dismantle the various nongovernmental structures of 
inequality that threatened the amendment’s vision of equal citizenship.”7  
Rebecca Zietlow, carefully developing an idea first explored by Kenneth 
Karst,8 has argued that equal citizenship under the reconstruction 
amendments carries with it “rights of belonging.”9  Such rights, Zietlow 
contends, are “more encompassing than the term ‘civil rights,’ [and] 
includ[e] rights that historically were not considered to be civil rights 
such as economic and social rights[.]”10  This idea of belonging is meant 
to capture and help “ensure inclusion, participation, and equal 
membership in our diverse national community.”11 
These ways of thinking about Fourteenth-Amendment citizenship 
do much to expand our understanding of the amendment and the 
 
 6. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).  Saenz may be the exception that proves the rule.  In that case the 
Court used both the Citizenship Clause and the Privilege or Immunities Clause to ground a 
constitutional right to travel, specifically the right of citizens to move into another state and be 
treated equal to those already residing there.  Id. at 502-03 (quoting both clauses).  While courts and 
commentators sometimes mistakenly state that the Saenz Court relied on only the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, the Citizenship Clause also played a significant role in the Court’s analysis.  Id. 
at 506-07.  First, this right was already well established.  See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 
(1969), overruled on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).  The Saenz court 
was simply reaffirming it and giving it specific textual grounding and so did no new work.  Second, 
this right to equal treatment for new residents appears to be as far as the Court is willing to venture.  
By using the two citizenship clauses for so narrow a right, the Court in fact restricted them by 
narrow application even as it appeared to invigorate them.  Lawrence Tribe seems to have been 
proven right that Saenz is more the limited product of a federalism-influenced Court than a well-
spring for new constitutional rights.  Lawrence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges 
or Immunities Revival Portend the Future – or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 Harv. L. 
Rev. 110, 197-98 (1999). 
 7. AKHIL AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 381-82 (2005). 
 8. See KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (1989). 
 9. REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE 
PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 6 (2006). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
3
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potential for governmental action at all levels.12  For example, a right of 
belonging arguably supports government programs that seek to develop 
and enforce a robust understanding of welfare rights, something that the 
more circumscribed view of traditional individual rights under due 
process or equal protection rubrics have failed to do.13  It also refocuses 
constitutional thinking away from rights that are primarily individualist 
toward a contextualization of individual rights with a focus on inclusion 
in a self-defining community in which the very act of inclusion enhances 
rights both communal and individual.14 
Still, these approaches to equal or constitutional citizenship 
represent a starting point, not a conclusion.  Taking up the invitations of 
these scholars, my project is to delve more deeply into the possible 
meanings of constitutional citizenship, but to do so from a different 
angle.  Somewhat in the tradition of the popular constitutionalism 
scholars,15 I propose that the best source for meanings of constitutional 
citizenship will come not from traditionally originalist sources but from 
those who attempted to redefine citizenship in a more egalitarian and 
democratic manner and who established, both in word and in practice, 
meanings for citizenship on the ground.  To do this, however, I will 
borrow a theoretical framework from political and social theory: the 
theories of civil society and the public sphere.  I do so because I think 
they capture—in ways often missed by both legal scholars and 
historians—the structure of nineteenth century social experience while at 
the same time also connecting this experience to modern notions of 
politics and society.  After explicating some of the main principles of 
civil society and public sphere theory, I will then analyze a particular 
 
 12. By “all levels” I means to include all three branches — judicial, legislative, and executive 
— as well as federal, state, and local governments.  One of the more important aspects of Professor 
Zietlow’s approach is that it gives far more legitimacy to congressional actions, and also sets far 
more rigorous standards for judging those actions, than do most judicacentric constitutional 
theories.  See id.  I believe a rich theory of constitutional citizenship requires all levels of 
governmental activity. 
 13. E.g., KARST, supra note 8, at 134-46; ZIETLOW, supra note 9, at 150-51. 
 14. KARST, supra note 8, at 189-216. 
 15. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNETT, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).  Professor Zietlow’s book is in this vein as well, 
although she focuses mainly on congressional speakers.  See ZIETLOW, supra note 9, at 9, 145-59.  
For examples of historical legal scholarship that looks beyond governmental actors, see WILLIAM 
FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991); William Forbath, 
The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165 (2001); James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth 
Amendment versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 
1921-1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
4
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form of civil society and the public sphere that I think reveals important 
aspects of democratic citizenship—the black convention movement.  As 
we will see, this movement both enacted citizenship on the ground and 
engaged in a discourse about citizenship in the public sphere that 
presented alternative visions of citizenship.  Ultimately this experience 
shows how one essential aspect of citizenship is the creations of spaces 
for citizenship activities and engagement with the democratic public 
sphere. 
I.  CIVIL SOCIETY, THE PUBLIC SPHERE, AND COUNTERSPHERES 
Originating simultaneously in Tocquevillian ideas of voluntary 
associations and Hegelian critiques of market capitalism, modern ideas 
of civil society stress the public yet non-governmental character of civil 
society.16  Robert Post and Nancy Rosenblum, in an analysis of modern 
ideas of civil society, have defined it as the realm of social life 
characterized by “plural and particularistic identities[,]”—“a zone of 
freedom for individuals to associate with others and for groups to shape 
their norms” and determine their own goals and operations.17  Whether 
the focus is primarily on non-profit, communal voluntary associations, 
or on other types of association, ranging from familial to economic 
associations, the core idea is that civil society provides an activity-based, 
non-governmental arena for citizenship and provides “seedbeds” for a 
fully engaged citizenship.18  Civil society theory—even in its very 
divergent manifestations19—provides important insight on how 
 
 16. On the diverse aspects of civil society evident in Tocqueville and Hegel, see JOHN 
EHRENBERG, CIVIL SOCIETY: THE CRITICAL HISTORY OF AN IDEA 121-32 (discussing Hegel), 160-
69 (1999) (discussing Tocqueville); JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND 
POLITICAL THEORY 91-116 (1992) (discussing Hegel); JEFFREY C. ALEXANDER, THE CIVIL SPHERE 
99-101 (2006) (discussing Tocqueville).  Hegel’s analysis of civil society arises mainly in G. W. F. 
HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §§ 182-256 (Allen W. Wood ed., H. B. Nisbet 
trans., 1991).  Tocqueville discusses aspects of civil society throughout both volumes of 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA.  See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 205-223, 590-
616 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2004). 
 17. Nancy L. Rosenblum & Robert C. Post, Introduction to CIVIL SOCIETY AND 
GOVERNMENT 1, 3 (Nancy L. Rosenblum & Robert C. Post eds., 2002).  Their definition is 
structured as a contrast to government, which is “a domain of common purpose and identity.”  Id. 
 18. Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Some Questions for Civil Society-Revivalists,  75 
CHI-KENT L REV 301, 309 (2000) (citing, inter alia, COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOCIETY, A CALL TO CIVIL 
SOCIETY: WHY DEMOCRACY NEEDS MORAL TRUTHS (1998); SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE: SOURCES OF 
COMPETENCE, CHARACTER, AND CITIZENSHIP IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (Mary Ann Glendon & David 
Blankenhorn, eds. 1995).  See also Rosenblum & Post, supra note 17. 
 19. Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Foreword: Legal and Constitutional Implications 
of the Calls to Revive Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 289, 292 (2000) (discussing the variety 
of views of civil society). 
5
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democratic citizenship can exist and develop outside the immediate 
relations to the state, and thus permits us to see the overlapping nature of 
the different aspects of citizenship, whether they be legal status (e.g., a 
person is a citizen of the U.S.), political activity (e.g., a person acts as a 
citizen when voting), or social (e.g., being a “good citizen” by 
contributing to the common good in a tolerant and civil manner).  Civil 
society theory also has the benefits of being based on a concept 
reasonably well known at the time of the initial implementation of the 
Reconstruction Amendments—Tocqueville’s Democracy in America 
was one of the more popular works of the 1850s20—and as we will see, it 
helps frame a better understanding of how citizenship was thought to 
exist contextually in the nineteenth century.  The history of civil society 
therefore provides some opportunity to think more fully about 
democratic citizenship in law and culture and to investigate the ways in 
which freedom and equality can—and cannot—develop outside and 
alongside relations to the state. 
Yet its strength is also its weakness: the concept of civil society 
often bends too far away from the state, becoming seemingly oblivious 
to the government’s role as a representative and agent of the citizenry.  It 
is therefore also important to attend to the intersections between state 
and civil society, for it is here, most of all, where people are citizens.  
Just as civil society theory provides a necessary corrective to ideas of 
citizenship by orienting us away from the thin conceptualization of 
citizenship currently associated with constitutional law, public sphere 
theory provides an essential perspective to civil society theory by 
orienting us back to the relationship both civil society and the citizen 
necessarily have with the state.  As Jean Cohen has argued, the concept 
of civil society often presumes a focus on the voluntary associations of 
private life and omits any consideration of the public sphere or the 
integrated relations of government and civic life.21  Theories of the 
public sphere correct this omission by centering themselves on precisely 
the points where government and civic life intersect.  As described by 
Jürgen Habermas, the public sphere consists of all places in our society 
where “something approaching public opinion can be formed,” whether 
in the media, through elections, or in public fora,22 and many of the 
 
 20. MATTHEW MANCINI, ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE AND AMERICAN INTELLECTUALS: FROM 
HIS TIMES TO OURS ix-x (2006). 
 21. Jean L. Cohen, American Civil Society Talk, in CIVIL SOCIETY, DEMOCRACY, AND CIVIC 
RENEWAL 55-56 (Robert K. Fullinwider ed., 1999). 
 22. Jürgen Habermas, THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA ARTICLE, reprinted in 
CRITICAL THEORY AND SOCIETY: A READER 136 (Stephen Eric Bronner & Douglas MacKay 
6
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actors in such are themselves organizations and structures of civil 
society. 
As we will see in the ensuing discussion of the battles over freedom 
and citizenship in the South after the Civil War, and as is also evident 
from the history of the women’s suffrage movement, it is in the public 
sphere where claims are made for citizenship, claims made by the 
excluded, often using the structures of civil society, who were seeking to 
implement and re-define Reconstruction.  It is in the public sphere where 
individuals come together in groups seeking recognition and rights as 
citizens, where the democratic benefits of civil society can be articulated 
to the legal and political spheres, where democratic critique can be 
maintained, and where political, economic, and social transformations 
can take place.  While it may be civil society that provides the seedbeds 
for citizenship, citizenship qua citizenship can only bloom in the public 
sphere, for it is there that people assert their inherent equality and their 
status as full citizens, engaged in commerce, entertainment, and public 
activity on par with all others.  This is why the public sphere was so 
hotly contested, defended by whites against claims of equal access by 
blacks, delimited by men against the incursions of women, and was 
generally the site of battle for equal and free citizenship in the decades 
after the Civil War. 
Still, despite its more democratizing character, the concept of the 
public sphere has been shown to itself be problematic.  To the extent that 
the concept derives from Habermas’ early construction of a bourgeois 
public sphere which prized open debate among social equals and which 
assumed a possibility of universalizing as an ideal for democratic society 
and democratic discourse, Nancy Fraser has argued persuasively that this 
form of public sphere is elitist and exclusionary and certainly not an 
adequate site for democratic critique of governmental, economic, or 
social subordinations.23  Instead, Fraser and others have pointed to the 
need to account for oppositional discourse and activity in the public 
spheres constructed within excluded or subordinated communities.  With 
 
Kellner eds., 1989) (1964).  See also JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas Burger & 
Frederick Lawrence trans., Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1989) (1962). 
 23. Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually 
Existing Democracy, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 109 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1992).  As 
Robert Asen and Daniel Brouwer have aptly stated, this bourgeois public sphere is problematic 
because the “homogenous class standing of the bourgeoisie engendered a shared vision of the good 
that blocked as potential topics of deliberation the arrangements that sustained actual exclusions 
from the public sphere.”  Robert Asen & Daniel C. Brouwer, Introduction, in COUNTERPUBLICS 
AND THE STATE 1, 5 (Robert Asen & Daniel C. Brouwer eds., 2001). 
7
Fox: Fourteenth Amendment Citizenship
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
14-FOX(2).DOC 7/6/2009  12:07 PM 
1252 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:1245 
more historical attention to the development of social movements and 
subordinated groups, these scholars have identified “counterpublics” or 
“enclaves” in which the democratizing value of the public sphere is 
imagined and out of which come claims to citizenship and equality that 
in fact reform or transform the concepts themselves.24  Under this vision, 
counterpublics are sites where excluded or subordinated groups can 
develop and refine counterdiscourses, both to maintain and develop their 
own meanings and identities and, importantly, to re-engage the dominant 
“public” sphere in a critical discourse.  This approach suggests the 
possibility of a plural public sphere, or what Robert Asen has described 
as a multiplicity of public spheres.25 
The move to recognize multiple publics and to validate the publics 
and discourses developed in reaction to exclusionary, dominant publics 
is critical to being able to understand discourses about democratic 
citizenship during and after Reconstruction.  As we will see, the 
dominant public discourse about citizenship failed to address many of 
the fundamental experiences and problems of black citizens, and the 
need for black citizens to engage in both public sphere discourse and 
alternative public discourses was essential.  Yet even the refinement of 
public sphere theory to include an essential pluralism remains troubling 
if it focuses solely on the externality of counterpublics.  Ultimately we 
need to be able to follow Jeffrey Alexander and reorient ourselves back 
toward civil society and democratic citizenship.  Alexander values the 
focus on alternative publics of scholars such as Nancy Fraser, but he 
argues that these counterpublics, in their most important manifestations 
as vibrant social movements, “are oriented not simply toward gaining 
resources and power vis-à-vis the civil sphere but to securing a respected 
place within it.”26  The universalizing rhetoric of democratic citizenship 
and democratic civil society retain, for Alexander, a component of 
critique that is lost in an excessive focus on counterpublics as purely 
sites of identity and community formation for the purpose of seeking 
power.  Alexander sees in counterpublic theory a danger of reducing 
 
 24. See, e.g., Mary P. Ryan, Gender and Public Access: Women’s Politics in Nineteenth-
Century America, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE, supra note 23, at 259; Carol C. Gould, 
Diversity and Democracy: Representing Differences, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: 
CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 171, 172-76 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996); Geoff 
Eley, Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth Century, in 
HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE, supra note 23, at 289; Catherine R. Squires, Rethinking the 
Black Public Sphere: An Alternative Vocabulary for Multiple Public Spheres, 12 COMMUNICATION 
THEORY 446, 466 (2002). 
 25. Asen & Brouwer, supra note 23, at 6-10. 
 26. ALEXANDER, supra note 16, at 276. 
8
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counterpublics to countercultures and of falling into the trap of 
instrumentalism, of seeing political discourse as a battle of interests to 
obtain power rather than as a dynamic process of realizing, albeit 
necessarily imperfectly, a universalizing potential that is democratic 
civil society.27  What we will then need to examine are ebbs and flows of 
this dynamic between the universalizing character of civil society and 
citizenship and the particularizing aspects of the necessary and essential 
formations of multiple publics and multiple civil spheres. 
Theories of civil society and the public sphere therefore offer a 
promising language for understanding the experience of constitutional 
citizenship in the years of and following Reconstruction, and they can 
themselves be rethought or refined by studying the experiences of 
claiming and implementing citizenship on the ground.  I take up this 
period not because of some originalist desire to divine the 
understandings or intent of the framers and ratifiers of the 
Reconstruction Amendment (although African American understandings 
of citizenship are essential to any originalist project since, as Peggy 
Cooper Davis and others have has pointed out, the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments were only ratified with the political participation 
of black Americans28), but rather because in giving depth to the 
meanings of general political and cultural concepts such as citizenship 
one needs, I think, to explore the lived experiences of the concept.   As 
we will see, the experiences of trying to claim, define, and implement a 
free and equal citizenship after the war led African Americans and some 
white Republicans to enact citizenship on the ground, giving detail to 
vague constitutional language.  The ensuing battles over citizenship that 
took place then identified, in ways that can only happen on the ground, 
the key sites and experiences of citizenship, both in the assertions of 
citizenship by African Americans and in the denials of that citizenship 
by white Democrats. 
II.  CITIZENSHIP CREATION DURING RECONSTRUCTION: THE LEGAL 
RIGHTS OF FREE LABOR 
Many scholars follow historian Eric Foner’s lead in arguing that 
Reconstruction Republicans adhered to a free labor ideology that 
 
 27. Id. at 279. 
 28. PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES 
221 (1997). 
9
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identified freedom primarily with the right to earn wages.29  Thus in the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 Republicans linked citizenship with the rights 
to contract and own property, and they repeatedly proclaimed the value 
of contract labor arrangements as the apotheosis of the new freedom and 
citizenship that they saw themselves granting to blacks.30  While there 
may have been a variety of Republican views on how expansive such 
rights would be, the basic thrust of congressional ideas of citizenship 
was that (male) citizens should have governmental protection of rights to 
contract, to buy, sell, and hold property, and to gain access to courts to 
protect those rights, all of which implemented the right of citizens to 
earn and support themselves with their own labor. 
In its specific listing of rights and privileges, the Act asserted and 
protected a collection of citizenship rights, including rights of contract, 
property, and access to the courts.31  To the modern ear, these are rather 
routine; but in the context of post-bellum, post-slavery America their 
centrality to creating a fully vibrant free, civil society was more directly 
evident.  Take, for example, the right to contract.  On one level it 
secured simply the legal right to transact and enforce agreements.  Yet, 
in the context of the 1860s, this freedom to contract was fundamental.  
The country was developing into a modern force of industrial capitalism, 
and contract was one of the legal engines driving this transformation.  
Indeed, as Morton Horwitz argued in his classic discussion of the issue, 
“[t]he triumph of a contractarian ideology by the middle of the 
 
 29. See generally FONER, supra note 2; ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: 
THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (Oxford University Press 
1995) (1970); JAMES D. SCHMIDT, FREE TO WORK: LABOR LAW, EMANCIPATION, AND 
RECONSTRUCTION, 1815-1880 (1998); AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE 
LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION (1998).  I have 
previously developed this idea in James W. Fox Jr., Democratic Citizenship and Congressional 
Reconstruction: Defining and Implementing the Privileges and Immunities of Citizenship, 13 
TEMPLE POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 453, 460-66 (2004). 
 30. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (protecting the civil rights of United States 
citizens).  The Act provided: 
[A]ll persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding 
Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such 
citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or 
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have 
been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United 
States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, 
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal 
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed 
by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to 
none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary 
notwithstanding. 
 31. See id. 
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nineteenth century enabled mercantile and entrepreneurial groups to 
broadly advance their own interests through a transformed system of 
private law.”32  Access to contract rights was the ticket to citizenship in 
the new capitalist economy.  Congressional Republicans, by the very act 
of equating basic legal rights with freedom and racial equality, were re-
defining legal citizenship in a way that incorporated some aspects of the 
citizenship of belonging.  They were in fact re-creating a political 
society in which commercial norms such as free labor and free contract 
were the inheritance of each male33 citizen regardless of race, and in 
opening citizenship across race, Republicans were redefining citizenship 
to mean inclusion in civil society.34 
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 also secured property rights.35  
Property was integral to self-sufficiency, and the goal of free labor, 
ultimately, was some ownership of property, both personal and real.  Yet 
property, as Eric Foner has observed, represented a key ambiguity 
during Reconstruction.36  For white Republicans, property rights 
provided a means for securing productive, free-labor agriculture; while 
blacks might develop ownership of farms and plantations, the land itself 
was seen as primarily a productive resource that would replicate, in 
agricultural form, northern capitalism.  For the former slaves, on the 
other hand, land ownership created a zone of independence and privacy, 
a place where they need not work for former-masters at depressed wages 
but could instead become self-sufficient, secure in their homes and their 
families, while also providing a means to bargain up wages for the labor 
they chose to sell.37 
These differing views of property also reflected fundamental 
differences regarding civil society.  For northern Republicans, civil 
society focused significantly on the steering of labor toward economic 
 
 32. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 211 
(1977). 
 33. It is of course vital to state that the citizen ideal was, at this point, purely masculine for the 
male actors of Reconstruction.  Although feminists had well articulated, in the Declaration of 
Sentiments and elsewhere, the inherent hypocrisy and intellectual illegitimacy of making 
universalizing claims to a gendered definition of citizenship, such a counter-discourse was yet to 
affect the dominant male discourse.  This topic will require a much fuller exposition in what I 
expect to be a book on this topic; for now I merely note its importance.  On the importance of 
contract ideology, contract-as-metaphor, and the inherent tensions between those and gender 
subordination during this period, see AMY DRU STANLEY, supra note 29. 
 34. On inclusion as an aspect of citizenship, see KARST, supra note 8, at 189-216. 
 35. See Act of April 9, 1866, supra note 30. 
 36. See FONER, supra note 2, at 54. 
 37. See id. (discussing the dilemmas of the free labor ideology during Reconstruction). 
11
Fox: Fourteenth Amendment Citizenship
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
14-FOX(2).DOC 7/6/2009  12:07 PM 
1256 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:1245 
productivity.38  This vision and commitment would be sorely tested in 
the coming decades as labor developed its own views of civil society 
through labor unions and battled with many in the Republican Party, 
who shifted toward a predominantly industry- and business-oriented idea 
of civil society.39  But in the 1860s it was still possible to maintain an 
egalitarian vision of free labor in which civil society and industrial labor 
were seen as unified. 
For southern blacks, however, wage labor seemed anathema to 
democratic civil society.  The civil rights of contract and property were 
instead means of protecting and developing counterweights in civil 
society to the oppressions of post-slavery economic and political 
structures.  Through the ownership of land and protections of access to 
the courts and enforcement of contracts, blacks could, it was thought, 
carve out spheres for families and churches, benevolent and economic 
associations, schools and newspapers, and could generally build 
community supports for their newly acquired legal citizenship.40 
While the visions of civil society imagined by northern whites and 
southern blacks varied substantially, both understood that legal rights 
and legal citizenship helped create the possibility of black participation 
in civil society.41  It is important to see both the transformative and the 
restrictive aspects of the dominant citizenship discourse of 
Reconstruction.  On one level Reconstruction really did present a radical 
transformation to ideas and realities of citizenship.  The democratizing 
ideals of the Jacksonian era, in which white laborers had become full 
citizens and the right to labor, contract, and property were claimed to be 
open to all classes,42 merged with abolitionist ideals of racial equality.  
Legal rights were the site of communal transformation that had not been 
possible before 1865 in either the slaveholding south or in the Jim Crow 
north.43  Yet this transformation only occurred with the assurances of 
 
 38. See infra note 39. 
 39. On these issues, see generally FORBATH, supra note 15; DAVID MONTGOMERY, CITIZEN 
WORKER: THE EXPERIENCE OF WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES WITH DEMOCRACY AND THE FREE 
MARKET DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1993). 
 40. See FONER, supra note 2, at 54 ("As Northern investors understood the term, 'free labor' 
meant working for wages on plantations; to blacks it meant farming their own land, and living 
largely independent of the marketplace.").  See also id. at 364-79. 
 41. See id. at 370-73. 
 42. See, e.g., Theda Skocpol, The Tocqueville Problem: Civic Engagement in American 
Democracy, 21 SOC. SCI. HIST. 455, 460 (1997) (drawing connections between Jacksonianism, 
expanded suffrage, and Tocquevillian associationalism). 
 43. On the segregationist and white supremacist nature of northern antebellum society, see 
LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790-1860 (1961). 
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limitations.  In 1866 there was no place for black suffrage in the claim to 
full citizenship, and certainly no space for “social” citizenship, for equal 
access to public spaces in a way that would accord full civil status to 
black citizens.  For these claims to break into citizenship discourse, the 
dominant public sphere would need a new discourse constructed from 
other public spaces, spaces where subordinated black voices could use 
the freedoms and rights of their newly acquired first-level citizenship to 
press for the continued transformation of citizenship and civil society. 
III.  CREATING A BLACK CIVIL SOCIETY AND PUBLIC SPHERE: THE 
BLACK CONVENTION MOVEMENT 
Free labor citizenship was one of the dominant ideas of free 
citizenship present during Reconstruction, but it was predominantly an 
ideal advanced by northern elites (white and black) and was not 
necessarily the ideal for all freed blacks.44  This is evident from the very 
start of the post-war period.  African-American men had been meeting in 
national conventions since before the Civil War, and many black men, 
from both the North and the South, met at national and state conventions 
after the war.45  These conventions were significant civic and citizenship 
acts on a number of levels.  First, they demonstrated the remarkable 
commitment to active engagement with civil society in just the way that 
Tocqueville had identified as a crucial aspect of the American brand of 
democratic citizenship.46  By engaging in this culturally valorized means 
of association and expression, black Americans enacted political 
citizenship through the public sphere despite their disenfranchisement 
throughout most of the country.47  Through the type of group activity 
common to large associations—committee work, drafting resolutions, 
debating proposals, compromising, balancing competing interests, 
building coalitions—participants in these conventions could engage in 
the activities of democratic citizenship.  And often the conventions 
 
 44. See FONER, supra note 2, at 289. 
 45. Philip S. Foner and George E. Walker performed a tremendous service in compiling the 
materials from the state and national black conventions of the 19th century.  See 1 PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE BLACK STATE CONVENTIONS, 1840-1865 (Philip S. Foner & George E. Walker eds., 1979) 
[hereinafter 1 PROCEEDINGS, 1840-1865]; 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BLACK NATIONAL AND STATE 
CONVENTIONS, 1865-1890 (Philip S. Foner & George E. Walker eds., 1986) [hereinafter 1 
PROCEEDINGS, 1865-1890]. 
 46. See, e.g., TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 16, at 215-23 (discussing political associations), 604-
609 (discussing civil and political associations). 
 47. Of course first generation feminists had also invoked this social/political practice, most 
prominently in the 1849 Seneca Falls Convention that produced the Declaration of Sentiments. 
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produced formal political activity by sending petitions to Congress, the 
President, or to the general citizen.48  These conventions reveal how 
important the overlapping nature of citizenship can be, and how 
important the public sphere and civil society are for the engagement in 
and claim for full citizenship status.  The very act of claiming citizenship 
through public discourse in voluntary associations itself defined the 
nature of that citizenship and helped eventually to transform that 
citizenship into a recognition of political citizenship more broadly by the 
dominant society. 
This final point bears emphasis.  When the citizenship activity of 
Reconstruction is viewed primarily as that of congressional actions, as 
the writing of legislation or the drafting of constitutional amendments, 
then citizenship remains passive.  It is a thing granted, not claimed or 
asserted.  While the egalitarian nature of this grant was indeed radical 
for the time and essential to any future development of full democratic 
citizenship, it was the claiming of citizenship by African Americans that 
reveals the full potential of citizenship activity.49  The state and national 
conventions of African Americans thus represent a crucial and defining 
aspect of a more vibrant, active, and realizable citizenship. 
African American conventions also defined citizenship through 
their specific articulations of the meaning of citizenship and freedom.  In 
numerous meetings and conventions of freedmen meeting at the end of 
the Civil War, black Americans expressed their own understandings of 
freedom and full citizenship by stating their expectations and demands 
of whites in what would be, they hoped, a new country.50  Full access to 
American citizenship meant something very real and specific.  Freed 
blacks certainly wanted access to the basic legal rights such as contract 
and property ownership; the free labor ideal of legal citizenship held a 
prominent place in African American articulations of citizenship, 
especially in the earlier conventions of 1865 and 1866 which were 
dominated by men who had been free before the war and possessed 
some property.51  Yet even in the early conventions the citizenship 
claims were more encompassing and fuller. 
 
 48. Eric Foner, Rights and the Constitution in Black Life during the Civil War and 
Reconstruction, 74 J. AM. HIST. 863, 867-69 (1987). 
 49. See ELIZABETH REGOSIN, FREEDOM’S PROMISE: EX-SLAVE FAMILIES AND CITIZENSHIP IN 
THE AGE OF EMANCIPATION (2002). 
 50. See generally 1 PROCEEDINGS, 1840-1865, supra note 45; 1 PROCEEDINGS 1865-1890, 
supra note 45. 
 51. FONER, supra note 2, at 112. 
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Just as critical to the claim of citizenship through civil rights of 
contract and property were the uniform arguments of black conventions 
to assert a right to the franchise as fundamental to any meaningful 
citizenship or freedom.52  Congress had famously temporized on black 
suffrage in the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment, as Radical 
Republicans did not appear to have the votes to achieve it.53  Each 
convention focused on calls for Congress to grant and protect the right of 
black citizens to vote, often pointing out that their citizenship-claim to 
suffrage, as loyal citizens who fought for the Union, were plainly greater 
than those of the former Confederate soldiers.54  It was also clear to 
these convention members that the other rights could be rendered 
meaningless without access to political powers.  For black Americans 
during Reconstruction, access to civil society and political activity went 
hand-in-hand, and unlike the progression in Congress where civil rights 
came first, for African Americans the ballot was seen as the more 
important right, on which all others could depend.55  As John Mercer 
Langston, one of the leading African-American legal and political 
thinkers and activists, stated, suffrage was more fundamental than even 
the basic civil rights of property and contract because it was central to 
self-government and free institutions, and was “a constituent element of 
manhood; . . . it stands prominent among the chief duties of civil society 
to sustain and guard it.”56 
 
 52. See, e.g., 1 PROCEEDINGS, 1865-1890, supra note 45, at 80 (discussing the Norfolk 
Convention of 1865), at 81 (discussing “Address From the Colored Citizens of Norfolk, Va., to the 
People of the United States”); FONER, supra note 2, at 180 (discussing the Raleigh Convention of 
1865).  See also Foner, supra note 48, at 872-73. 
 53. FONER, supra note 2, at 251-61; Xi Wang, Black Suffrage and the Redefinition of 
American Freedom, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 2153, 2179-95 (1995-1996). 
 54. See, e.g., 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BLACK STATE CONVENTIONS, 1840-1865 302 (Philip S. 
Foner & George E. Walker eds., 1979) [hereinafter 2 PROCEEDINGS, 1840-1865]. 
 55. Id.; see also FONER, supra note 2, at 289. 
 56. JOHN MERCER LANGSTON, FREEDOM AND CITIZENSHIP 110 (Mnemosyne Publishing 
1969) (1883).  For Langston, and for other men advocating black rights during this period, 
“manhood” was often used synonymously with citizenship.  E.g., Address of the Colored State 
Convention to the People of the State of South Carolina, in 2 PROCEEDINGS, 1840-1865, supra note 
54, at 299.  The fact that the idea of citizenship was so often described in expressly gendered terms 
reveals some of the dangers inherent in this concept, and certainly the dangers in not carefully 
regarding the context of historical uses of the concept.  On the problem of citizenship defined as 
“manhood,” see NANCY ISENBERG, SEX AND CITIZENSHIP IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 191-204 
(1998).  On the construction of a specifically African-American idea of manhood, see the essays in 
1 A QUESTION OF MANHOOD: A READER IN U.S. BLACK MEN’S HISTORY AND MASCULINITY 
(Darlene Clark Hine & Earnestine Jenkins eds., 1999); 2 A QUESTION OF MANHOOD: A READER IN 
U.S. BLACK MEN’S HISTORY AND MASCULINITY (Darlene Clark Hine & Earnestine Jenkins eds., 
2001). 
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But just as political rights were critical for the protection of civil 
society, so too was civil society critical in the claim for political rights.  
Eric Foner has observed that one of the main reasons that black suffrage 
was on the national agenda after the war—given that northern whites 
had not previously seen black suffrage as important—was the 
persistence and skill of blacks from New Orleans in petitioning Congress 
to address the issue.57  In particular, the Creole community had a history 
of developed civil society in an enclave of freedom before the war.  
They had established a wide range of civil activities, from schools to 
orphanages to a free press to successful businesses, all of which 
supported a vocal and active political community.  This enabled 
representatives of the community to present, in person, forceful 
arguments on behalf of black suffrage in ways that northern whites were 
compelled to take seriously.58 
One of the most striking examples of these issues came from South 
Carolina Freedmen’s Convention, meeting in Charleston at the Zion 
Presbyterian Church in November 1865.59  First, the participants 
recognized the full breadth of the communal and personal experiences at 
issue when they stated that they gathered “to deliberate upon our 
intellectual, moral, industrial, civil, and political condition.”60  Notice 
that this was not a matter of isolating civil rights from political rights, or 
civil and political from economic, education, or moral rights and duties; 
the type of isolated parsing of layers of citizenship that Congress would 
engage in early 1866 made little sense to the men who were claiming 
freedom and citizenship from a history of bondage. 
This point was reinforced through the language the convention used 
to describe what had been denied in slavery and what was required in 
freedom: “Heretofore we have had no avenues opened to us or our 
 
 57. Foner, supra note 48, at 867-69. 
 58. Id.  A similar point could be made about northern free blacks who had developed a 
nascent, enclave-like civil society that included black churches (especially the A.M.E. Church) and 
a black press in the north as part of the black abolitionist movement.  These civil society 
organizations and activities helped fuel both the abolitionist movement and the subsequent 
movement for black citizenship and suffrage.  On antebellum northern black society generally, see 
PATRICK RAEL, BLACK IDENTITY & BLACK PROTEST IN THE ANTEBELLUM NORTH (2002); JAMES 
OLIVER HORTON & LOIS E. HORTON, IN HOPE OF LIBERTY: CULTURE, COMMUNITY, AND PROTEST 
AMONG NORTHERN FREE BLACKS, 1700-1860 (1997); LITWACK, supra note 43; JANE H. PEASE & 
WILLIAM H. PEASE, THEY WHO WOULD BE FREE: BLACKS’ SEARCH FOR FREEDOM, 1830-1861 
(1974). 
 59. For the South Carolina Convention of 1865 discussed here, see 2 PROCEEDINGS, 1840-
1865, supra note 54, at 286-304. 
 60. Id. at 298 (discussing “Address of the Colored State Convention to the People of the State 
of South Carolina”). 
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children—we have had no firesides that we could call our own; none of 
those incentives to work hard for the development of our minds and the 
aggrandizement of our race in common with other people.”61  This 
describes not just a desire to have access to property and contract rights, 
but a fuller context in which those rights are implemented or denied.  
This is a claim not for rights in and of themselves so much as for rights 
as opportunities (“avenues”); not to the right of free labor for individual 
economic benefit but for intellectual and communal development 
(“development of our minds and the aggrandizement of our race”).62  
This latter point in particular shows how individual and communal were 
understood together, how they were more integrated than classical 
liberal ideology and free labor ideology would indicate.  The desire of 
freed blacks to be free of white control meant that “autonomy” for 
blacks consisted of “autonomy both as individuals and as members of a 
community.”63  Whereas whites often talked of autonomy or freedom in 
more individualized terms, there was a clear communal consciousness in 
claims of autonomy and freedom by blacks.  In this respect, civil society 
and citizenship claims by blacks should be seen as much more able to 
unify individualistic and communal concepts. 
Yet it would be a mistake to see in the communal conceptions of 
Reconstruction-Era blacks a rigid separatism along racial lines that 
inhibited understandings of broader democratic community and 
citizenship.  In several of the black conventions, delegates debated issues 
of race-consciousness and separatism.  For example, in Pennsylvania the 
delegates debated whether to condemn black merchants who do not treat 
black customers equally to white customers, ultimately deciding that 
preferential treatment of white customers was against their principle of 
equality, even if opposing such preferences entailed some economic 
sacrifice by black merchants.64  Black delegates were beginning to work 
out an issue that they could only address fully in the black public sphere: 
the relative role and value of race-based community building versus 
race-neutral claims of individualized equality.  It was these debates that 
helped build a base for how biracial legislatures during Reconstruction 
would approach issues of social equality.  Separate schools were often 
supported by black communities and Reconstruction legislatures in 
states that had substantial black legislative participation during 
 
 61. Id. at 298-99. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Foner, supra note 48, at 870. 
 64. 1 PROCEEDINGS, 1865-1890 supra note 45, at 147-48 (discussing the Proceedings of 
Pennsylvania Convention, 1865). 
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Reconstruction, such as South Carolina and Mississippi.65  Yet these 
legislatures also advocated and passed laws desegregating public 
accommodations, and objected to laws requiring segregated schools.66  
For black leaders during Reconstruction, racial separation and race-
based social communities were part of a pluralistic, as opposed to a 
racialized, conception of American democracy.  Race mattered, and 
racial improvement and consciousness could be harnessed in a positive 
way, yet the public and legal understanding of persons, that is, 
citizenship was itself not racialized.  As Eric Foner has written, “while 
most blacks valued [their] autonomous institutions and did not object to 
voluntary racial separation, they insisted the state must remain color-
blind.”67  This was a conception of citizenship that was at once 
aspirational about the promise of de-racialized equality and grounded in 
a recognition of the reality of racialized communities. 
The South Carolina convention went on to frame these rights of 
citizenship in a larger context of civil society.  In a statement to the 
United States Senate and House, the South Carolina convention listed 
the rights and privileges that they expected the federal government to 
secure, including: a right to receive protection of law and government 
(“the strong arm of law and order”), a right to protect laborers’ ability to 
sell labor just as merchants sell their goods, a right to fair consideration 
of their claims on the “land question” (a reference, no doubt, to General 
Sherman’s forty-acre-and-a-mule land grant, reversed by President 
Johnson68), and a right to bear arms on a basis equal to whites.69  These 
rights themselves seem consistent with rights recognized by 
congressional Republicans, even if Republicans failed to secure the land 
grants.  But the members of the convention also claimed more than these 
basic legal rights.  Like all other black conventions of the period, they 
asserted a right to suffrage, citing the injustice of being taxed without 
representation and the need to have suffrage to protect against unjust 
 
 65. FONER, supra note 2, at 365-68.  Foner cites some instances, such as in New Orleans, 
where integrated schools were sustained for some period of Reconstruction, but for the most part he 
finds that African-Americans were more interested in establishing public education in the first place 
than in pressing for integrated education. 
 66. Id. at 368-70. 
 67. Id. at 372. 
 68. On the Sherman land grant and the forty-acres-and-a-mule idea, see generally CLAUDE F. 
OUBRE, FORTY ACRES AND A MULE: THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND BLACK LAND OWNERSHIP 
(1978). 
 69. 2 PROCEEDINGS, 1840-1865, supra note 54, at 302 (discussing “Memorial to the Senate 
and House of Representatives of the United States, in Congress Assembled” in South Carolina, 
1865). 
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laws, reflecting a view consistent with John Mercer Langston’s 
articulation of suffrage as a threshold right.70  Thus in South Carolina, as 
in Louisiana and elsewhere, blacks participating in a black public sphere 
responded to congressional hesitancy with their own re-definition of 
basic citizenship rights. 
The South Carolina convention went beyond this, however, and 
began developing an exploration of citizenship rights even broader than 
one connecting suffrage and basic civil rights.  In their statement to 
Congress the delegates also asserted a right to secure “the three great 
agents of civilized society—the school, the pulpit, the press[.]”71  Here 
we see most plainly a claim to civil society—or what they refer to as 
civilized society—in which education, religion, and the press are as 
fundamental to basic citizenship and freedom as first order legal rights 
and suffrage.  This statement echoes Tocquevillian ideas that civil 
society in a democracy is composed of a range of activities (rather than 
merely voluntary associations).72  The delegates to the South Carolina 
convention evidently understood that they were situated within a legal, 
political, and civil society, and that access to all spheres of social and 
political engagement were important in a broad nexus of activities of 
civil society.  This view is further evident in their assertion of a right to 
engage in political discourse in open-access political conventions in 
which all citizens could debate the fulfillment of what they describe as 
basic rights “to enter upon all avenues of agriculture, commerce, [and] 
trade; to amass wealth by thrift and industry; [and] the right to develop 
our whole being by all the appliances that belong to civilized 
society[.]”73 
This final phrase—“develop our whole being by all the appliances 
that belong to civilized society”—aptly characterizes how the 
convention understood the situatedness of the individual rights.  It 
 
 70. Id.; see also LANGSTON, supra note 56, at 110. 
 71. 2 PROCEEDINGS, 1840-1865, supra note 54, at 302 (discussing “Memorial to the Senate 
and House of Representatives of the United States, in Congress Assembled” in South Carolina in 
1865). 
 72. Tocqueville discusses a range of components of civil society, including press (Book I, 
chapter 11), political associations (Book I, chapter 12), public associations (Book II, chapter 5), and, 
to some extent, religion (Book II, chapters 9 & 12).  See Tocqueville, supra note 16.  On the 
importance of understanding that Tocqueville’s analysis of civil society was both broader than 
voluntary associations and also somewhat critical of such associations, see Robert T. Gannett, Jr., 
Bowling Ninepins in Tocqueville’s Township, 97 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REV. 1, 1-2 (2003) 
and Keith E. Whittington, Revisiting Tocqueville’s America, 42 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 
21, 21-24 (1998). 
 73. 2 PROCEEDINGS, 1840-1865, supra note 54 at 291, 302. 
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connects self-realization (“develop our whole being”) with the structures 
of civil society (“the appliances that belong to civilized society”).  It also 
employs a double meaning that unites individual African Americans to 
the African American community by referring to “our whole being.”  
This message to Congress reflects a radical joining of traditionally 
liberal ideas of legal rights, emerging ideas of suffrage rights, and an as 
yet under-developed idea of the spheres of civil society—including 
education, commerce, labor, religion, and the press, among others—as 
necessary components to full development of citizenship and 
personhood. 
In conjunction with many of the black state and national 
conventions, black southerners were also forming local and state Equal 
Rights Associations.  Several of the state conventions specifically 
referred to the associations as the organizational arms to carry out the 
proposals and projects discussed and supported by the convention 
delegates.74  Equal Rights Associations and Union Leagues took the 
ideals of the black conventions—the claims for equal legal rights, 
political activity, education, labor rights, and public welfare—to the 
local level.  Equal Rights Associations and Union Leagues actively 
sought to implement black citizenship through a number of activities, 
ranging from advocating suffrage, to leading protests against segregated 
street cars, to organizing state black conventions, to assisting the poor 
and helping establish schools.75  The Georgia Equal Rights Association 
had been established by the Georgia Freedmen’s Convention with the 
purposes of securing equal rights, aiding the poor, and promoting 
education for African Americans throughout Georgia.76  These 
associations often had close ties with the Freedmen’s Bureau; Georgia’s 
association was headed by a former officer of the Georgia division of the 
 
 74. In November 1865, the National Equal Rights League held its first meeting in Cleveland.  
See 1 PROCEEDINGS, 1865-1890, supra note 45, at 40.  The Pennsylvania Convention was itself the 
Annual Meeting of the Pennsylvania State Equal Rights League.  Id. at 132.  In Georgia, the 
convention that met in January, 1866 referred in its opening to the Georgia Equal Rights 
Association.  Id. at 232. 
 75. FONER, supra note 2, at 64; JONATHAN M. BRYANT, HOW CURIOUS A LAND: CONFLICT 
AND CHANGE IN GREENE COUNTY, GEORGIA, 1850-1885, 104-118 (1996) (discussing activities of 
Equal Rights Associations in Georgia).  On the Union Leagues, see generally MICHAEL W. 
FITZGERALD, THE UNION LEAGUE MOVEMENT IN THE DEEP SOUTH: POLITICS AND AGRICULTURAL 
CHANGE DURING RECONSTRUCTION (1989). 
 76. BRYANT, supra note 75.  Bryant depicts the efforts of the Equal Rights Association to 
fight violence and unjust legal treatment in Greene County and throughout Georgia after the war.  
Id. at 104-11, 113-18.  See also FONER, supra note 2, at 117 (describing the “Georgia Equal Rights 
and Educational Association”). 
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Freedmen’s Bureau.77  Equal Rights Associations thus combined the 
ideals and personnel from the black conventions with the governmental 
support and personnel of the federal government.  Such organizations, 
while partly political, were also general social service operations 
designed to implement more fully freedom and citizenship within the 
black communities of the South.  This was, quite simply, civil society 
writ small, a localized and focused effort to bring political claims to 
citizenship down to the personal, local, and immediate level for many 
blacks throughout the south.  What is particularly impressive about this 
movement is the combination of speed and breadth by which the 
movement made its way from national conventioneering to local 
political and social organizing, a movement that could only happen if it 
was coming from the ground up as well as the top down and by a 
combination of political and social service activity.78  The activities of 
Union Leagues, Equal Rights Associations, and numerous other black 
social groups were as much civic duties—burial of the dead, education 
and literacy, coordination of religious services—as they were political.79 
The activities of the Associations and Leagues also achieved 
another function: they were a means of the type of dignity-claiming 
activity essential to democratic citizenship.  As Michael Fitzgerald has 
argued, Union League activity, along with other mass actions by black 
citizens, “were . . . assertions of self-respect,” public statements of 
dignity, equality, and citizenship.80  When blacks acted collectively 
throughout the urban centers of the south to challenge segregation in 
1867—longshoremen’s strikes in the port cities, other strikes in 
Richmond and Selma, streetcar boycotts in Mobile—there was a 
fundamental claim of full citizenship being made.81  And for black 
citizens who were both claiming and re-defining citizenship, civil, 
political, and social equality were part of this citizenship package. 
It should not be surprising that a more radical engagement with 
civil society took place through the Equal Rights Associations and 
Union Leagues than had been expressed at the black conventions of 
1865 and 1866.  The conventions largely advocated a moderate form of 
civil society and civil and political rights.  While they understood the 
 
 77. BRYANT, supra note 75, at 104. 
 78. See, e.g., FITZGERALD, supra note 75, at 117 (noting “interconnection between political 
insurgency and labor concerns in League-sponsored mass activity”). 
 79. See generally 1 PROCEEDINGS, 1840-1865, supra note 45; 1 PROCEEDINGS, 1865-1890, 
supra note 45. 
 80. Id. at 127-28. 
 81. Foner, supra note 48, at 874. 
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combination of rights more organically than did congressional leaders, 
blacks at the conventions often echoed the free labor ideals being 
articulated by white Republicans in the North.82  What developed more 
fully in the ensuing years of Reconstruction was a recognition of the 
active aspects of politically engaged citizenship and the need for federal 
and other governmental protections for the free exercise of citizenship.83  
That this realization took place on the ground indicates just how 
complicated and embedded the resistance to equal citizenship was; it 
also shows exactly why it is critical for civil society to be grounded 
locally as well as organized nationally.  Moreover, the experiences of the 
associations and leagues in working with the federal government 
through the Freedmen’s Bureau left African Americans and some local 
white Republicans with a firmer understanding of the importance of 
governmental supports for the activities of civil society and its 
nongovernmental associations. 
The more politicized and statist understanding of civil society that 
arose in the black public sphere also came about because of the 
remarkable participation of black citizens in local, state, and federal 
government in the years of congressional Reconstruction, beginning in 
what Eric Foner has described as the annus mirabilis of 1867.84  As 
African Americans gained more power, they both learned the importance 
of governmental action and, in the face of increased white hostility in 
other spheres—economic oppression, physical violence, etc.—they also 
recognized the essential nature of governmental power in combating 
racial oppression in civil society.85  That is, blacks learned that the state 
itself was an essential instrument of equal citizenship because civil 
society itself allowed for the perpetuation of racial norms. 
The importance of the state in black republican views of civil 
society was reflected in the actual activities pursued by Reconstruction 
legislators and governments in southern states with substantial black 
participation for the brief period from 1867 through 1874.86  It was in 
this time that several southern legislatures adopted desegregation laws, 
asserting a right to open and equal access to public accommodations.87  
The effort to desegregate streetcars and public events began with black 
and white civil rights protests, including boycotts and sit-ins, in the 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. FONER, supra note 2, at 282. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See infra notes 87-93. 
 87. FONER, supra note 29, at 878-80; FONER, supra note 2, at 346-92. 
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antebellum north.88  This movement continued in the postbellum south, 
with streetcar lines in New Orleans and Charleston changing 
segregationist policies in the face of these protests.89  In combination 
with the more radical white and black republicans of the north, 
particularly centered in Massachusetts, southern state legislatures 
followed with new laws desegregating public accommodations.90  As 
Eric Foner observes, the effort to pass laws desegregating public 
accommodations, including common carriers, places of amusement, and 
even businesses licensed by the state, at first met with overwhelming 
opposition from white Republicans and failed to pass, but as blacks 
gained more political power and prowess, they were able to persuade 
enough whites to achieve passage of the laws in several southern 
states.91  Legislatures with substantial black participation also produced 
an activist state in terms of the range of services provided, particularly to 
the poor.  Legislatures funded medical care, legal assistance, 
orphanages, and of course schools.92  Reconstruction legislatures also 
enacted some laws protecting laborers, including giving workers a first 
lien on an employer’s property.93  Government, under this vision, 
worked to produce equal citizenship both by pursuing desegregation of 
basic governmental functions and by providing governmental services to 
all races, even if often in a de facto segregated manner, in a way that 
began to look like the provision of social rights and privileges that would 
not be more fully developed, in practice and in political theory, until the 
20th Century. 
III.  IMPORTANCE OF THE STATE AND PROBLEMS OF A BIFURCATED 
CIVIL SOCIETY 
Even if we can find in the Reconstruction era evidence of a black 
civil society and public sphere that developed citizenship ideas and 
practices and moved the concept of citizenship beyond the more narrow 
confines articulated by congressional Republicans in 1865 and 1866, the 
fact remains that the ideal of democratic citizenship only appeared 
fleetingly during that period and was violently and systematically 
suppressed thereafter.  What are we to make, therefore, of the historical 
 
 88. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and 
Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1342 (1996). 
 89. FONER, supra note 2, at 281-82. 
 90. Massachusetts passed the first major state desegregation law.  FONER, supra note 2, at 28. 
 91. Id. at 370-71. 
 92. Id. at 368. 
 93. Id. at 373. 
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denial of equal, democratic citizenship from about 1876 through at least 
the 1970s, a denial whose effects are felt very profoundly still? 
On one level we can see in the loss of the possibilities that began 
budding during Reconstruction the critical importance of federal 
supports for citizenship.  The Supreme Court played its part in the 
demise of federal support for federal citizenship, with decisions such as 
The Slaughter-House Cases94 and the Civil Rights Cases,95 which 
converted federal citizenship into a legal chimera and incapacitated 
congressional authority to define and implement citizenship through 
very narrow and formalistic readings of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Whereas occasional political will at the federal level had led to the 
federal suppression of the Ku Klux Klan in the early 1870s—largely 
through the coordinated efforts of the newly minted Department of 
Justice and the military—the loss of that will and the eventual 
acceptance by the Republican party of an accommodation with the white 
south effectively eliminated the main means of opposing a violent 
overthrow of democratic government.96  The “Redemption” of the south 
by white Democrats shows how fragile civil and political citizenship can 
be when it is confronted with persistent violent opposition without the 
protection of the government.  One of the most important basic rights 
cited by the South Carolina black convention was the protection by the 
government, both by law and by force.97  Absent such protection, absent 
the countervailing force represented by the state, civil society simply 
cannot develop, at least not in an integrative and open manner.  While 
more recent analyses of civil society in the context of twentieth century 
totalitarian and authoritarian states highlights the problem of the overly 
repressive state,98 the creation of the firmly Jim Crow south reveals how 
the removal of state power can also destroy the freedom and other 
 
 94. 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
 95. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 96. FONER, supra note 2, at 454-59.  For a history of the prosecution of the Klan in this 
period, see William S. McFeely, Amos T. Akerman: The Lawyer and Racial Justice, in REGION, 
RACE, AND RECONSTRUCTION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF C. VANN WOODWARD 395 (J. Morgan 
Kousser & James M. McPherson eds., 1982). 
 97. 2 PROCEEDINGS, 1840-1865, supra note 54, at 284-304. 
 98. See, e.g., David A. Crocker, Civil Society and Transitional Justice, in CIVIL SOCIETY, 
DEMOCRACY, AND CIVIC RENEWAL, supra note 21, at 375; CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL CHANGE 
IN ASIA: EXPANDING AND CONTRACTING DEMOCRATIC SPACE (Muthiah Alagappa ed., 2004). 
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benefits of civil society, especially when practices of subordination are 
allowed to operate on civil society.99 
However, it must also be noted that the eventual dominance of Jim 
Crow occurred through the state, that is, through the instrumentality of 
state and local governments.  It was most clearly the desire of white 
Democrats to control the state apparatus; the point was to control state 
government and to keep the federal government from interfering on 
behalf of black citizens.100  That this means of control could only be 
effectuated through the combined use of private violence and a cover of 
state legitimacy did not change the fact that the state was a significant 
player.  Thus the critical problem, in the context of postwar white 
supremacy, was the loss of competing state organizations.  As would be 
the case in the modern civil rights movement, implementation of 
citizenship, and the reconstruction of American civil society, required a 
vibrant, active, and competitive federal structure. 
What happened to civil society during this period is also instructive.  
With the loss of state protection for black participation in and 
constructions of civil society, black citizens had to create more defined 
and cohesive enclaves of oppositional civil society.101  White 
supremacists still strove to attack instantiations of successful black civil 
society—Jim Crow violence was often directed against black businesses, 
black property owners, black civil associations, black schools, etc.102—
but the ability of black communities to sustain themselves, to educate 
their youth, to acquire some level of financial support, and to sustain 
voluntary and religious organizational structures that could support 
resistance is a remarkable testament to the capacity of enclaves or 
counterspheres to exist and develop.103  The problem, however, was that 
the development of such enclaves, in a closed civil society that was 
rigidly bifurcated and insufficiently porous, meant that the ideals of 
democratic citizenship, the ideals expressed, albeit differently, in both 
white Republican and black ideology from Reconstruction, ideals of a 
 
 99. For my own analysis of the operation of Jim Crow on civil society, see James W. Fox Jr., 
Intimations of Citizenship: Repressions and Expressions of Equal Citizenship in the Era of Jim 
Crow, 50 HOWARD L. J. 113 (2006). 
 100. Id. at 135-37; 152-61. 
 101. Id. at 161-188. 
 102. See, e.g., LEON F. LITWACK, TROUBLE IN MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF 
JIM CROW, 150-67 (1998). 
 103. See, e.g., Fredrick C. Harris, Will the Circle be Unbroken?  The Erosion and 
Transformation of African-American Civic Life, in CIVIL SOCIETY, DEMOCRACY, AND CIVIC 
RENEWAL, supra note 21, at 317.  Harris focuses more on the middle-to-late-20th century, but his 
analysis of the role of segregation-era black civil society applies quite well here. 
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more universal citizenship that allowed for open access to all the 
“appliances” of civil society, could not in fact take place.  Instead, what 
developed was, on the one hand, a false universal seen in the conversion 
of free labor ideology to a freedom of contract regime that privileged 
white supremacist, male capitalism as itself a universalized reality in the 
public sphere,104 and, on the other, an aggressively exclusionary public 
sphere and uncivil society where the borderlands were patrolled with 
violence against the incursion of labor, nonwhites, and women.105 
Jeffrey Alexander, in analyzing how Jim Crowism affected and infected 
the promise of civil society, argues (based in part on Houston Baker’s 
analysis) that white America’s creation of itself as a rational and “civil” 
or “civilized” society depended in fundamental ways on the 
simultaneous subordination of blacks and the imagining of blacks as 
inherently uncivil and uncivilized.106  Thus white civil society itself 
became a distorted inversion, at once proclaiming its own universality 
while also depicting this universal as set against racial exclusion. 
The response to this, as we have seen, was for black citizens to 
create a countersphere, or black civil society.  Although Alexander fails, 
I think, to account for the development of civil society within black 
southern society prior to the 1920s (he focuses mainly on the 
development of particularly urban aspect of black civil society after 
World War I),107 the basic point he makes that it was the discourses and 
institutions and cultural reproductions within black civil society that 
produced many of the possibilities of a unifying civil society, or what he 
calls civil repair is, I think, important.108  Once civil society was firmly 
divided with the ending of Reconstruction and creation of Jim Crow by 
about 1900, it would be primarily through the counterspheres—spheres 
 
 104. This, essentially, is the regime represented by the Supreme Court’s fin-de-siècle 
jurisprudence simultaneously upholding the activist state actions of white supremacy and uprooting 
state protections of labor in order to protect industrial capitalism.  See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 
U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan. 347 U.S. 
483 (1954), and Lochner v. People of the State of N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled in part by 
Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. State of Mo., 342 U.S. 421 (1952), and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 
(1963). 
 105. Alexander sees this move to force and violence as the product of an insufficiently 
developed civil sphere.  ALEXANDER, supra note 16, at 266.  I would attribute it at least as much to 
failures of the state—in this instance the federal government—as I would to failures of either 
Alexander’s civil sphere or civil society more generally.  I should note, however, that Alexander’s 
civil sphere seems to include at least portions of the state, such as law and legal systems, which 
bring my view closer to his. 
 106. ALEXANDER, supra note 16, at 269-73. 
 107. See id. at 293-391. 
 108. Id. at 265-385 (discussing race and civil repair). 
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in the black community, the women’s suffrage movement, immigrant 
communities, and the labor movement—that a reconstruction of civil 
society could be fueled.  In fact it is a remarkable feature of black civil 
society, from Reconstruction through the Civil Rights Movement, that 
one of the, but certainly not the only, dominant discourses was a 
universalizing, idealized vision of civil society and a surprisingly 
hopeful view of citizenship as a promise realizable through the rule of 
law.109  As we saw above with respect to the period of Reconstruction, 
black civil society throughout Jim Crow contained and nurtured a 
discourse of civil society that was both universalizing and critical of the 
dominant, but uncivil white society.110 
IV.  LESSONS AND CAUTIONS 
The initial experiences of African Americans in claiming and 
creating citizenship after the establishment of formal citizenship under 
the Fourteenth Amendment reveal some important aspects of citizenship, 
civil society, and the public sphere.  First, it seems clear from the 
experiences of black political discourse and the communal engagement 
of the convention movement that an alternative public sphere, one 
dedicated to the participation of African Americans and to the 
expression and development of issues and ideas concerning black 
Americans was critical to the creation of some level of democratic and 
equal citizenship during Reconstruction.  The efforts to include suffrage 
within a basic definition of citizenship would have been far less 
effective, and far easier for whites to sidestep, were it not for the 
persistent emphasis of blacks enacting their citizenship claims. 
Furthermore, the ability of African Americans to engage in their 
own public spheres to develop discourse—an ability made possible, we 
should note, by the first-order legal rights of free assembly and free 
 
 109. See, e.g., ALFRED L. BROPHY, RECONSTRUCTING THE DREAMLAND: THE TULSA RIOT OF 
1921, RACE, REPARATIONS, AND RECONCILIATION 79 (2002) (discussing the importance of law, 
constitutionalism, and equal citizenship in the Oklahoma black community of the 1910s).  Brophy 
accurately depicts how this more liberal vision co-existed alongside a more militant position 
favoring forceful self-defense supported in part by black soldiers returning from World War I—both 
positions being united, in important ways, by claims of and to full citizenship.  Houston A. Baker, 
Jr. makes a similar point about how, in his own experience, black civil society, and the black public 
sphere, sustained a spirit of civil repair: “[T]he Constitution of the United States and the American 
national flag were valued sites of patriotism and pride for the black public sphere.”  Houston A. 
Baker, Jr., Critical Memory and the Black Public Sphere, in THE BLACK PUBLIC SPHERE: A PUBLIC 
CULTURE BOOK 23 (The Black Public Sphere Collective ed., 1995). 
 110. On the sustaining of a constitutional discourse within one black community during Jim 
Crow, see BROPHY, supra note 109. 
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speech that had been denied in the antebellum South—made the 
discourse that took place in the authoritative public sphere, the one in 
which legal and policy changes are made, that much richer.  This history 
indicates that some version of multiple or counter-spheres can be 
important to enriching democratic citizenship and democratic decision-
making in a pluralist society.  It is also important to any understanding 
of how people can claim and define their own citizenship and thus 
convert mere citizenship into democratic citizenship.  These benefits 
were seen in the biracial legislatures of Reconstruction, where the 
discourses of multiple public spheres could engage each other in a larger 
public sphere and help produce a range of governmental programs and 
laws which accounted for a richer, more varied type of citizenship than 
one finds in earlier, uniracial debates even within the Republican party. 
Second, black citizens’ engagement with these political issues was 
done initially as an act of political citizenship prior to the formal grant 
of political citizenship through suffrage.  While legal or civil citizenship 
rights, in the sense of rights to assembly and speech, may well have been 
necessary for the development of the black public sphere; the right to 
suffrage was not.  Indeed, the opposite may have been true: it was the 
discourse developed in the black public sphere which insisted on 
suffrage and which helped prepare African Americans for effective 
political activity once suffrage came.  In this sense, while the vote may 
well have been fundamental to retaining effective implementation of 
other rights—as John Mercer Langston, Frederick Douglass,111 and 
others argued—actions within the black public sphere and civil society 
may themselves have been fundamental to the establishment of suffrage, 
even if temporarily.  The relationship between black civil society/public 
sphere and political citizenship was symbiotic, not a progressive move 
through stages.  Moreover, as the legislative agendas of the 
Reconstruction legislatures point out, even social rights—the rights to 
education and public services—began developing in this context as 
well.112  Reconstruction reveals that the full citizenship develops in a 
more organic and less legalistic way than is conceived of by common 
constitutional understandings of citizenship. 
Third, it is important to recognize how delegates to black 
conventions talked about civil society in a way at once embracing 
 
 111. E.g., LANGSTON, supra note 56; WILLIAM S. MCFEELEY, FREDERICK DOUGLASS 246 
(1991) (discussing Douglass’s support for the vote as essential for the protection of other rights); 
Fox, supra note 29, at 469-71 (discussing Langston and Douglass). 
 112. FONER, supra note 2, at 364-79 (discussing range of state-supported activities and projects 
initiated and developed by Reconstruction state governments). 
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individualized rights to labor, contract, and property consistent with 
white Republican ideals, and asserting a communal character to the 
establishment and development of the citizens for whom these rights 
were to operate.  Theorists of civil society often claim as one of its 
virtues that it bridges the individual and communal theories of 
democratic society;113 historically, it was in the counterspheres or 
alternate civil societies of the nineteenth century in which such claims 
were most seriously and consistently developed, as evident in the black 
convention movement (one can make a similar case for the women’s 
suffrage movement of the period and, I think, for some aspects of the 
labor movement a few years later).  Contrary to some civil society 
revivalists who jump directly from Tocqueville and the Age of Jackson 
to late-twentieth century neighborhood associations with a curious 
inattentiveness to what happened between,114 the most instructive and 
constructive source for how civil society can build citizenship and 
engage social-moral issues comes from the social movements that 
sought to realize the democratic citizenship promised of the 
Reconstruction Amendments.115 
Fourth, the broader social and cultural experience of black citizens 
after the war reveal aspects of civil society that are essential to account 
for in any decent conception of democratic citizenship.  In thinking 
about what democratic citizenship can mean, and in thinking about how 
efforts were made to try to achieve it in the past, it should be 
remembered that full citizenship implies access to a range of social and 
cultural activities and communities.  The statements from the South 
Carolina convention about needing access to all avenues and appliances 
of citizenship reflect an important indication of how civil society in its 
broadest form, from voluntary associations to families to religious 
communities to economic organizations, would be necessary for 
 
 113. E.g., Rosenblum & Post, supra note 17, at 3-4. 
 114. E.g., Jean Bethke Elshtain, Will the Real Civil Society Please Stand Up?, 75 CHI-KENT L. 
REV. 583, 583-84 (identifying individual moral leaders in American history, but ignoring social 
movements in civil society).  Robert Putnam is much more attentive to the historical development of 
voluntary associations, include within black communities.  See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING 
ALONE 390-91 (2000).  However, because Putnam tends to view voluntary associationalism as 
something unique or separate from social movements and group political consciousness, his analysis 
misses the importance of the connections between civil society organizations and the public sphere.  
See also Gerald Gamm & Robert D. Putnam, The Growth of Voluntary Associations in America, 
1840-1940, 29 J. INTERDISCIPLINARY HIST. 511 (1999).  On the problem of Putnam’s failure to 
account for the public sphere, see generally Cohen, supra note 21. 
 115. See supra Part I. 
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developing citizenship, both individually and communally.116  
Citizenship, as a concept, should allow for consideration of these aspects 
of civil society, for it is in the nongovernmental spheres of civil society 
where the citizen can be made and supported.  This point is particularly 
crucial for theorists and advocates on the left, who can easily succumb to 
an excessive focus on state action and can see social movements as 
largely divorced from their communal roots, warts and all.  The non-
governmental communal organizations that support civil society are also 
potential sources of exclusion and demarcation on their own and can 
replicate other subordinations and/or serve to divide social movements 
in ways advantageous to those seeking to deny full citizenship to 
subordinated groups and people.  This is arguably one of the 
consequences of the insistence on citizenship as a male sphere, as an 
expression of manhood, during Reconstruction, and is a crucial lesson in 
the dangers of both the civil sphere and of closed counterspheres. 
Fifth, it should not be forgotten that civil society and government 
are best seen as a two-way street.  Just as black civil society fed into 
governmental activities and conceptions of citizenship, the state was also 
a necessary part of securing the vibrancy of civil society.  It was, finally, 
the loss of governmental support, in the form of federal troops and legal 
actions, that made possible the end of Reconstruction and the rise of a 
fully bifurcated and subordinated civil society.117  While the church, and 
family, and other aspects of black civil society could serve as sites and 
sources for resistance to Jim Crow, it was the absence of state support 
that made this enclave resistance necessary. 
So where does this take us with respect to my initial questions 
about defining democratic citizenship and the possible ways of thinking 
about constitutional citizenship?   One answer surely is that it is deeply 
problematic to think of citizenship in a restricted, legalistic manner 
which would search for formal definitions and content in antebellum 
case law and Attorney General opinions.  If the experiences of the 
postbellum period tell us anything, they tell us that citizenship was being 
claimed at least as much as it was being granted.  More importantly, the 
people claiming citizenship were not bound by classical liberal ideas of 
legal citizenship and legal status for individuals, although those ideas 
were important.  Rather, they saw citizenship as a process of 
engagement by individuals with a variety of social, political, and legal 
groups or communities.  The development of citizenship through the 
 
 116. 2 PROCEEDINGS, 1840-1865, supra note 54, at 286-304. 
 117. BRYANT, supra note 75, at 104. 
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“appliances” of civilized society came to be seen as an engagement with 
many spheres of civil society itself, spheres ranging from legal to 
political to voluntary organizations to economic enterprises to education 
to religion to family and kinship.  Legal and legislative action supporting 
citizenship were critical, but as the failures of Reconstruction showed, 
they were plainly insufficient.  Voluntary and community associations 
provided critical loci for protest and organization, but they too were 
insufficient on their own.  Similarly, access to education, enjoyment of 
religious association and exercise, and a variety of political engagements 
were also necessary, but not sufficient, in forming successful resistance 
to denials of citizenship and in efforts to claim at least some degree of 
full citizenship.  Only through a complex engagement across all of these 
spheres would full democratic citizenship have had a chance to flourish; 
and primarily through the combined effort to destroy or constrain 
African Americans’ freedom across all these spheres did white 
supremacy retain power throughout the South. 
This analysis suggests that democratic citizenship, and the 
citizenship of inclusion and equality being explored during the initial 
implementations of the Fourteenth Amendment, must contain some 
degree of recognition of, access to, and support for the variety of spheres 
of civil society.  To the extent that citizenship is a developmental 
concept—and certainly in the transition from bondsmen to freedmen this 
was true—it must incorporate some ideas and policies for helping to 
create and sustain full citizens.  The experiences of Reconstruction also 
reveal that this process requires both state-based supports and programs, 
and extensive networks of private communal supports.  Indeed, the 
importance of civil society evident in this period itself indicates that the 
separation of state and private spheres is, as many people have argued, 
itself problematic, at least to the extent that it posits a hard separation of 
the spheres.118  The advantage of civil society and public sphere theory is 
precisely its ability to bridge this intersection of state and private in a 
way that more accurately captures what happened on the ground during 
and after Reconstruction and also permits us to see ways of reconciling 
and repairing the contradictions of equal citizenship ideas. 
 
 118. Although a topic for another day, this myth of separation of the private civil sphere from 
the public governmental sphere was one of the greatest legal-constitutional roadblocks to equal 
citizenship erected by the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases and related opinions. 
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